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TEXTUALISM, JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, AND THE
INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE THEORY
LEAH M. LITMAN* & KATHERINE SHAW**
This piece offers an extended critique of one aspect of the so-called
“independent state legislature” theory. That theory, in brief, holds that the
federal Constitution gives state legislatures, and withholds from any other
state entity, the power to regulate federal elections. Proponents ground their
theory in two provisions of the federal Constitution: Article I’s Elections
Clause, which provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof,” and Article II’s Presidential Electors Clause,
which provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled
in the Congress.” Proponents defend the theory as consistent with the text
and structure of the Constitution, as well as some nineteenth-century practice.
While the independent state legislature theory (ISLT) purports to
elevate state legislatures in the name of popular sovereignty and democracy,
in fact it dramatically expands the power of the federal judiciary at the
expense of both. At base, the ISLT is primarily a claim of authority on the
part of federal courts: it inverts a core principle of judicial federalism by
maintaining that the federal Constitution empowers federal courts to override
the judgments of state courts, state executive-branch officials, and state voters
about the meaning of state law. In the hands of the current Supreme Court,
this assertion of interpretive supremacy imposes on the states a narrow mode
of statutory interpretation—textualism—whose key justifications are largely
inapplicable to the states, with their myriad and varied institutional
arrangements.
The ISLT is fatally inconsistent with basic precepts of both federalism
and the separation of powers. But more than that, the ISLT is a lawless power
grab by the federal courts masquerading as deference to a romanticized vision
of the state legislature that fails to take state institutional design choices
seriously on their own terms.
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INTRODUCTION

This piece offers an extended critique of one aspect of the so-called
“independent state legislature” theory. That theory, in brief, holds that
the federal Constitution grants to state legislatures, and withholds from
any other state entity, the power to regulate federal elections. Proponents
ground the theory in two provisions of the federal Constitution: Article
I’s Elections Clause, which provides that “[t]he Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,”1 and Article II’s
Presidential Electors Clause, which provides that “[e]ach State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”2 Beyond this
constitutional text, defenders of the theory invoke “the structure and
political theory underlying the Constitution,”3 as well as some nineteenthcentury practice, as support for the view that the legislature is the only
organ of state government that may regulate federal elections.4
While the independent state legislature theory (ISLT) purports to
elevate state legislatures in the name of popular sovereignty and
democracy, it actually dramatically expands the power of the federal
judiciary at the expense of both. At base, the ISLT is primarily an
assertion of interpretive primacy on the part of the federal courts. Indeed,
a core component of the ISLT, properly understood, is that the federal
Constitution empowers federal courts to override the judgments of state
courts, state executive-branch officials, and state voters about the
meaning of state law. This assertion of power inverts a core principle of
judicial federalism, and in the hands of the current Supreme Court,
imposes a narrow mode of statutory interpretation—textualism—that,
whatever its merits in the federal system, is an exceedingly poor fit with
the myriad and varied institutional arrangements in the states.
*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
**
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Our thanks to
Cardozo student Lauren Chamberlin for invaluable research assistance, and to
participants at the June 2022 “Interpretation in the States” conference hosted by the State
Democracy Research Initiative at the University of Wisconsin Law School.
1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The clause goes on to provide that “the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.” Id.
2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
3.
Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal
Elections, and State Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2020).
4.
Id. During the 2020 election cycle, four members of the current Supreme
Court seemed to indicate their approval of the theory. See Richard L. Hasen, Identifying

and Minimizing the Risk of Election Subversion and Stolen Elections in the
Contemporary United States, 135 HARV. L. REV. F. 266, 289 & n.128 (2022).
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As we show in what follows, the ISLT is fatally inconsistent with
basic principles of both federalism and the separation of powers. But
more than that, the ISLT is a lawless power grab by the federal courts
masquerading as deference to a romanticized vision of the state
legislature that fails to take state institutional design choices seriously on
their own terms.5
We should note that in this short piece, we bracket the many forceful
critiques of the ISLT grounded in constitutional structure, history, and
political theory.6 Our focus is primarily on interpretive methods and their
interaction with institutional design and constitutional structure. For that
reason, we discuss constitutional structure only to the extent that it relates
to imposing a particular interpretive method on the states.
In addition, we do not offer a direct critique of a potential scenario
in which a state legislature, relying on Article II, seeks to assign to itself
the power to directly appoint presidential electors, including after voters
have cast their votes. That would, without doubt, represent one of the
most high-stakes, antidemocratic, and lawless contexts in which a
version—to be sure, a fringe version—of the ISLT might be deployed.
But, as far as we understand the rationales for such a move—which was
reportedly considered and urged by a number of Trump advisors and
supporters, including Ginni Thomas, in the aftermath of the 2020
election7—they do not entail claims that state entities have misinterpreted
5.
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Imperial Supreme Court 1 (July 28, 2022)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4175554
(“The
common
denominator across multiple opinions . . . is that they concentrate power in one place:
the Supreme Court.”).
6.
See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Independent State Legislature Claim,
Textualism, and State Law, 90 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 5),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4047322; Vikram David Amar &
Akhil Reed Amar, Eradicating Bush-League Arguments Root and Branch: The Article II
Independent-State-Legislature Notion and Related Rubbish, 2021 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2;
Michael Weingartner, Liquidating the Independent State Legislature Theory, 46 HARV.
J.L.
&
PUB.
POL’Y
(forthcoming
2023)
(manuscript
at
4),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4044138; Eliza Sweren-Becker &
Michael Waldman, The Meaning, History, and Importance of the Elections Clause, 96
WASH. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2021); Mark S. Krass, Debunking the Non-Delegation
Doctrine for State Regulation of Federal Elections, 108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3902163; Franita Tolson, The
‘Independent’ State Legislature in Republican Theory (Sept. 30, 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4226098.
7.
Barton Gellman, The Election That Could Break America, ATL. (Sept. 23,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refusesconcede/616424/ [https://perma.cc/384V-DXGG] (quoting the Pennsylvania state
Republican party chairman as describing direct legislative appointment of electors as
“one of the available legal options set forth in the Constitution,” and a state
Republican party leader reporting conversations about legislative appointment with
the Trump national campaign); Emma Brown, Ginni Thomas, Wife of Supreme
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state laws. They rest instead on the distinct (though related) claim that
state legislatures’ authority to prescribe the method of appointing
presidential electors is plenary. And, they maintain, that plenary
authority is somehow unconstrained by basic notions of due process and
democracy, or other constitutional provisions, like Article II’s express
assignment to Congress of the power to set the time for choosing
presidential electors.8 As profoundly misguided as such a claim is,9
debunking it is not our project here. Our focus is the independent state
legislature theory, not its warped variant, the anti-democratic state
legislature theory, which might be better described as the statelegislatures-as-the-end-of-democracy theory.
Putting to one side this warped variant, the ISLT may be invoked in
a number of different ways. Our critique is implicated most when a
federal court considers a claim that a state court or state agency has
exceeded its authority by misinterpreting and therefore departing from a
state statute regulating federal elections, at least as the federal court
interprets the state statute. This might happen where a state agency takes
some action that it believes is authorized by a state statute regulating
federal elections, or where a state court interprets such a statute. Often,
this strand of the ISLT is invoked when a state court or state executivebranch official interprets the state statute in light of a state constitutional
provision related to voting, or even concludes that a state statute is invalid
on the basis of a state constitutional provision related to voting, and the
federal court concludes that the state interpreter failed to sufficiently
adhere to the state statute as the federal court understands it. That is the
posture in which the doctrine has been deployed in a number of recent
cases.
The dynamics may be somewhat distinct under other
circumstances—where, for example, a state court has drawn maps that
will be used for federal congressional elections after the political process
has failed to produce a viable or legally sound map, and the allegation is
that the federal Constitution requires the state legislature alone to create
such a map.10 Such claims often sound in the idea at the core of the
Court Justice, Pressed Ariz. Lawmakers to Help Reverse Trump’s Loss, Emails
Show,
WASH .
POST
(May
20,
2022,
11:52
AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/05/20/ginni-thomas-arizonaelection-emails/ [https://perma.cc/H5TG-B6DL].
8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 4. Congress has set that date as the Tuesday
after the first Monday in November. 3 U.S.C. § 1.
9.
See J. Michael Luttig, The Republican Plan to Steal the 2024 Election,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/opinions/gop-blueprint-to-steal-the-2024election-luttig/index.html (Apr. 27, 2022, 9:09 AM).
10.
This fall, the Supreme Court will address this issue in a case out of North
Carolina. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 2901 (2022) (No.
21-1271); see also Jamelle Bouie, Next Time Trump Tries to Steal an Election, He Won’t
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ISLT—namely, that state entities other than the legislature lack the
authority writ large to regulate federal elections—without alleging a
misinterpretation or misapplication of state law. But our focus is on cases
where federal courts believe that a state entity or official has
misinterpreted or departed from a state statute as the federal courts
understand it.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLT
Before turning to our critique of the ISLT, we first provide a brief
overview of its origins. The theory traces back to the litigation over the
2000 presidential election in the state of Florida, and in particular to
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion, which both Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas joined, in Bush v. Gore.11 The per curiam opinion in
that case held that what it described as “standardless manual recounts”
violated the equal protection clause, and a bare majority of five Justices
stopped the recounts and handed George W. Bush the victory on that
basis.12 Because of that disposition, the Court did not address another
question on which it had granted cert:
Whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in establishing new
standards for resolving presidential election contests that
conflict with legislative enactments and thereby violate Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which
provides that electors shall be appointed by each State “in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”13
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion, however, did address
that question, arguing that Article II supplied an additional basis on which
to reverse the Florida Supreme Court. Pointing to the importance of the
election of the president and vice president, “the only elected officials
who represent all the voters in the Nation,”14 together with Article II’s
provision that “‘[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct,’ electors for President and Vice
President,”15 the concurrence concluded that, “[a] significant departure
from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents
Need

a
Mob,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(July
8,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/08/opinion/trump-democracy-states.html.
11.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
12.
Id. at 103.
13.
Brief for Petitioners at i, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (No. 00-949) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2).
14.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983)).
15.
Id.
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a federal constitutional question.”16 The concurrence reasoned that
because this was one of the rare instances in which “the Constitution
imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State’s
government,”17—here, the state legislature—“the text of the election law
itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on
independent significance.”18 The concurrence offered no support from
case law or principles of constitutional interpretation for this startling
assertion.
Many informed commentators, as well as several federal judges,
assumed that Bush v. Gore, including the Rehnquist concurrence, was
essentially a ticket good for one case and one case only.19 But then came
the 2020 election.20
Some Justices first signaled a renewed interest in the ISLT in
litigation arising out of Wisconsin. In the first round of the litigation, in
April 2020, the Supreme Court stayed a district court order that had
extended an absentee-ballot-return deadline to account for COVID-19
concerns; the Court’s per curiam opinion staying the injunction made no

16.
Id. at 113.
17.
Id. at 112.
18.
Id. at 113.
19.
See id. at 109 (per curiam opinion) (“Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances.”); see also, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future
of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 378–79, 387 (2001)
(“Nor was the Court merely silent on the issue of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value. It
expressly denied the case had any precedential value, something the Court could have
suggested more subtly in distinguishing Bush v. Gore’s facts in future cases to come
before it.”). One court of appeals invalidated a state’s voting practices—in light of Bush
v. Gore—over a dissent that “question[ed] the precedential value of Bush v. Gore.”
Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 881 (6th Cir. 2006) (Gilman, J., dissenting). The
case went en banc before becoming moot, and the panel opinion was vacated. Stewart v.
Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692, 692 (6th Cir. 2007).
20.
Even before 2020, however, several Supreme Court Justices invoked the
ideas underlying or adjacent to the ISLT when deciding constitutional questions. First, in
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., the Supreme Court held, by a sevento-two vote, that the federal National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) preempted
Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement for voting. 570 U.S. 1, 15 (2013). But in
dissent, Justice Thomas raised the question whether the NVRA infringed on state
legislatures’ ability to set conditions or qualifications on voting in violation of Article I,
§ 4. Id. at 29, 36 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He would not have reached that question
because it had not been raised, but he argued that the constitutional issues he identified
required construing the federal statute more narrowly. See id. at 36. Then in 2015, the
Court upheld a state constitutional provision that assigned the power to draw districts to
an independent redistricting commission. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 813 (2015). Chief Justice Roberts, writing for four
dissenters, would have held that the Elections Clause, Article I, § 4 of the Constitution,
required the legislature, rather than an independent commission, to draw districts. Id. at
825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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mention of the ISLT, primarily relying instead on the Purcell principle.21
As the general election approached later that year, and with the COVID19 pandemic still raging, the Wisconsin Elections Commission decided
to send absentee ballot applications to every voter.22 In light of the likely
increase in the number of absentee ballots cast, as well as postal service
delays and the state’s experience with the April primary, a district court
again extended the deadline for receipt of absentee ballots.23 The Seventh
Circuit stayed the injunction,24 and in October, the Supreme Court denied
the request to vacate the stay.25 The Supreme Court’s October order
produced no majority opinion, but two Justices in the majority wrote
separately to invoke the ISLT. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence suggested
there was a possible constitutional problem with the Wisconsin Elections
Commission’s decision to accommodate voters in light of the pandemic
because “[t]he Constitution provides that state legislatures—not federal
judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other state officials—
bear primary responsibility for setting election rules.”26 And Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence explicitly invoked the ISLT, favorably citing
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush v. Gore27 and asserting
federal-court authority to review state courts’ interpretations of state
election law: “the text of the Constitution requires federal courts to
ensure that state courts do not rewrite state election laws.”28
Several Justices subsequently invoked the ISLT in a case out of
North Carolina. As in Wisconsin, the postal service announced that it
might be unable to timely deliver completed absentee ballots that had
complied with North Carolina’s rules for absentee voting. In light of that
statement, several plaintiffs sued the North Carolina Board of Elections
in state court, seeking an injunction to extend the receipt deadline for

21.
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205,
1207 (2020). For a recent discussion of the “Purcell principle,” which the Court has used
to limit lower courts’ ability to change election rules near in time to elections, see Wilfred
U. Cordrington III, Purcell in Pandemic, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 941 (2021).
22.
See Patrick Marley, Wisconsin Elections Commission Approves Sending
2.7 Million Absentee Ballot Request Forms to Voters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June
17,
2020,
5:29
PM),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/06/17/wisconsin-electionscommission-finalize-mailing-absentee-ballot-reqest-forms/5329007002/
[https://perma.cc/ATW9-NYPK].
23.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 466 F. Supp. 3d 957, 970 (W.D.
Wis. 2020).
24.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 976 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.
2020).
25.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020).
26.
Id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphases added).
27.
Id. at 34 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
28.
Id.
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absentee ballots.29 The plaintiffs invoked the state constitution as the basis
for the requested injunction.30 The plaintiffs and defendants ultimately
settled on an agreement to extend the absentee ballot receipt deadline,
and the state court signed off on the parties’ settlement.31 A group of state
legislators then sought to intervene, arguing that the state court lacked
the authority to approve the settlement without their consent because the
legislature had to set the rules regarding federal elections.32 They sought
a stay from the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court denied the stay over
noted dissents by Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas.33 The legislators
then challenged the state court judgment in federal court; once again, the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, declined to stay the state
court’s decision.34 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, dissented,
once again invoking the ISLT.35
The ISLT also surfaced in litigation in Pennsylvania. There, a group
of voters obtained an injunction from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which concluded that the state constitution required the secretary of state
to extend the deadline for receipt of absentee ballots.36 In the period
following Justice Ginsburg’s death, but before the confirmation of Justice
Barrett, the U.S. Supreme Court divided four to four over whether to
stay that decision; because the Court was evenly divided, no stay was
issued.37 In the statement explaining the reasons Justices Alito, Thomas,
and Gorsuch voted to grant the stay, Justice Alito explicitly invoked the
ISLT:
The provisions of the Federal Constitution conferring on state
legislatures, not state courts, the authority to make rules
governing federal elections would be meaningless if a state
court could override the rules adopted by the legislature simply
by claiming that a state constitutional provision gave the courts

29.
N.C. All. for Retired Ams. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 20 CVS
8881, 2020 WL 10758664, *1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2020).
30.
Id. at *3.
31.
Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 97 (4th Cir. 2020).
32.
Emergency Application for Stay Pending Appeal at 1, Berger v. N.C. State
Bd. of Elections, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020) (No. 20A74).
33.
See Berger, 141 S. Ct. at 658. The state supreme court also denied a stay.
N.C. All. for Retired Ams. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 848 S.E.2d 496, 497 (N.C.
2020) (mem.).
34.
Moore v. Circosta, 494 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331 (M.D.N.C. 2020), injunction
pending appeal denied sub nom. Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020), stay
denied, 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020).
35.
141 S. Ct. at 47 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
36.
Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 386 (Pa. 2020).
37.
Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2020).

2022:1235

Independent State Legislature Theory

1243

the authority to make whatever rules it thought appropriate for
the conduct of a fair election.38
II. TEXTUALISM AND THE ISLT
This Part begins with an overview of textualism, then explains how
the ISLT effectively requires state courts to use the federal courts’
preferred version of textualism when interpreting state laws regarding
federal elections. It then discusses the federalism and separation of
powers issues that arise from requiring state courts to adopt the federal
courts’ preferred method of statutory interpretation when state courts are
interpreting state laws. In brief, the premises of textualism do not map
neatly onto the states; mandating textualism does not respect state
institutional design choices about how to allocate interpretive and
decision-making authority within state systems of government; and there
is no adequate legal basis for the federal courts to issue statutory
interpretation edicts to state courts about how to interpret state law.

A. Textualism: An Overview
We begin with a brief overview of textualism, which in recent years
has emerged as the nominal winner of the long-standing “statutory
interpretation wars”39 on the United States Supreme Court. The strain of
textualism that now claims dominance is sometimes referred to as “new
textualism,”40 and it is of fairly recent vintage. Although new textualism
has been around in some form since the 1980s,41 Justice Scalia and coauthor Bryan Garner’s Reading Law, a leading authority for today’s
textualists, was not published until 2012.42 And, despite Justice Elena
38.
Id. at 1 (statement of Alito, J.). After the election was over, Justices Alito,
Gorsuch, and Thomas would have granted certiorari to hear the case and address ISLT
issues. Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 738 (2021) (Alito, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); id. at 732–33 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
39.
Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The Congressional Bureaucracy, 168
U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1555, 1638 (2020); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 732 (2010).
40.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621,
623 (1990).
41.
Id.
42.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). According to a Westlaw search of cases—
“Reading Law: The Interpretation #of Legal Texts”—as of October 18, 2022, Reading
Law appears in 1,352 federal cases, 1,053 state cases, and 11 cases in territories for a
total of 2,416 cases. Within the federal cases, the Supreme Court cites the book 40 times,
the Courts of Appeals cite the book 664 times, and the District Courts cite it 547 times.
The remaining 101 federal citations come from bankruptcy courts, courts of federal
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Kagan’s famous 2015 line, “we are all textualists now,”43 it was not until
former President Trump managed to appoint three new justices to the
Supreme Court that there appeared to be anything approaching a solid
textualist majority on that court.44
The new justices have changed the landscape dramatically. Justices
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett were all avowed textualists before
joining the Court. As a nominee, Neil Gorsuch was hailed by the
conservative legal establishment as an “ardent textualist” and a “worthy
heir to Justice Scalia.”45 After his first full term on the Court, Justice
Gorsuch published A Republic, If You Can Keep It, which defended
textualism at length.46 As a judge on the D.C. Circuit, Brett Kavanaugh
wrote in the Harvard Law Review that, thanks to the “extraordinary
influence of Justice Scalia,” statutory interpretation had “improved
dramatically over the last generation.”47Amy Coney Barrett, whose
academic writings marked her as a clear textualist,48 proudly proclaimed
about Justice Scalia, “his judicial philosophy is mine too.”49

claims, courts of international trade, military courts, tax courts, and courts of appeals for
veterans claims.
43.
Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 08:30 (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg&feature=emb_title. See infra text
accompanying notes 76–79 for Justice Kagan’s revised assessment.
44.
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE
L.J. 1750, 1758 (2010) (“[T]extualism, . . . despite its significant impact on modern
statutory interpretation, has failed to emerge as the dominant methodology in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretive battles.”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (2006) (“Justices Scalia and Thomas are the only
self-identified textualists on the Supreme Court.”).
45.
Ramesh Ponnuru, Neil Gorsuch: A Worthy Heir to Justice Scalia, NAT’L
REV. (Jan. 31, 2017, 9:33 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/01/neil-gorsuchantonin-scalia-supreme-court-textualist-originalist-heir/ [https://perma.cc/MF5K-66RR].
46.
NEIL GORSUCH WITH JANE NITZE & DAVID FEDER, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU
CAN KEEP IT 132 (2019) (“Textualism honors only what’s survived bicameralism and
presentment—and not what hasn’t. The text of the statute and only the text becomes law.
Not a legislator’s unexpressed intentions, not nuggets buried in the legislative history,
and certainly not a judge’s policy preferences.”).
47.
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118, 2118 (2016) (book review).
48.
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2195 (2017) (“Textualists consider themselves bound to adhere to
the most natural meaning of the words at issue because that is the way their principal—
the people—would understand them.”).
49.
Marcia Coyle, “His Judicial Philosophy is Mine”: Amy Barrett Touts
Scalia in Remarks from Rose Garden, LAW.COM (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:27 PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/09/26/his-judicial-philosophy-is-mineamy-barrett-touts-scalia-in-remarks-from-rose-garden/?slreturn=20220021175107
[https://perma.cc/9K7X-S63S].
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The key claim of the new textualism—a once-insurgent,50 now
dominant, method—is that judges interpreting statutes should limit
themselves to the “plain meaning” of the words of the statute in question.
As Scalia and Garner wrote in Reading Law: “[t]extualism . . . begins
and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”51 In the words of
Dean John Manning, another textualist, “textualists choose the letter of
the statutory text over its spirit.”52 In Justice Gorsuch’s formulation in
Bostock v. Clayton County, “[o]nly the written word is the law . . . .”53
Proponents of textualism offer their method as an alternative to
once-dominant modes of statutory interpretation like purposivism or
intentionalism. They define textualism largely by what it does not permit:
in its pristine official formulation, textualism does not permit inquiry into
the intent or purpose of drafters, nor does it allow for consideration of
the consequences of adopting different interpretations. Scalia and Garner
argue that when interpreting a statute, judges should “look for meaning
in the governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne
from its inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’
extratextually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s
anticipated consequences.”54 When it comes to interpretive tools,
legislative history is anathema; dictionaries and interpretive canons are
revered.55
These textualist precepts contrast sharply with the basic principles
of purposivism. As leading purposivists Henry Hart and Albert Sacks
once argued, a court should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute . . . so
as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it
does not give the words . . . a meaning they will not bear.”56 More
recently, Judge Robert Katzmann’s book-length defense of purposivism
emphasized that statutes have “purposes or objectives that are
discernible” and that “the task of the judge is to make sense of legislation
in a way that is faithful to Congress’s purposes,”57 including by
examining context and legislative history. And Victoria Nourse has
50.
Cary Franklin, Living Textualism, 2020 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 120 (“Not too
long ago, textualism was an insurgent methodology.”).
51.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 42, at 16.
52.
John F. Manning, Textualism & Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419,
420 (2005).
53.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
54.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 42, at xxvii.
55.
See Gluck, supra note 44, at 1763.
56.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
57.
ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31 (2014); see also John Paul
Stevens,
Law
Without
History?,
N.Y.
REV.
(Oct.
23,
2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/10/23/law-without-history/
[https://perma.cc/3VRF-ZBVP] (reviewing KATZMANN, supra).
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defended a mode of “realist purposivism”58 that is clear-eyed about the
challenges of ascribing a single purpose to any congressional enactment,
but nevertheless takes seriously congressional process and what she terms
“legislative evidence.”59
Textualists do not merely reject other modes of statutory
interpretation, like Hart and Sacks-style purposivism,60 and pragmatic61
or dynamic62 modes of statutory interpretation. They go much further,
insisting that their method alone can guarantee both “interpretive
predictability” and “cabined judicial discretion.”63 Some textualists
maintain, in addition, that certain features of our system of separated
powers essentially require the federal courts to use textualism.64 On this
view, only textualism is consistent with the constitutionally prescribed
process for enacting federal legislation—bicameralism and
presentment65—and it is the only method that respects the limited role of
unelected judges in the federal system.
Textualists make two related claims for the constitutional imperative
of textualism (and its close corollary, the constitutional prohibition on
the use of legislative history). The first focuses on the lawmaking process

58.
VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 50
(2016).
59.
Id.
60.
HART & SACKS, supra note 56 (suggesting that courts “[i]nterpret the words
of the statute . . . so as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however,
that it does not give the words . . . a meaning they will not bear”).
61.
See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir.
2017) (Posner, J., concurring).
62.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1538 (1987) (“Dynamic statutory interpretation offers quite a different focus
from traditional theories of statutory interpretation . . . it treats the evolutive context as
a persuasive source of statutory meaning which should be considered in addition to the
statute's text and legislative history.”).
63.
Gluck, supra note 44, at 1762; see also Tara Leigh Grove, Which
Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 269 (2020) (describing that textualism is the
method that is most capable of “constrain[ing] judicial discretion and thus a judge’s
proclivity to rule in favor of the wishes of the political faction that propelled her into
power.”); Molot, supra note 44, at 25 (“[T]extualist criticism of strong purposivism
resembled Erie’s criticism of Swift. Just as the general federal common law came to be
viewed as ‘little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should
be the general law on a particular subject,’ so too did textualists highlight the way in
which purposivist readings of statutes tend to confuse Congress’s statutory instructions
with the policy preferences of purposivist judges.”) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
64.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68–69 (1994).
65.
Id. (stating that “[t]he Constitution limits what counts as ‘law[,]’” which is
limited to text enacted “by two Houses of Congress and one President”) (emphasis
omitted); see also Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L.
REV. 1337, 1349 (2019).
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prescribed in Article I, Section 7. In Judge Frank Easterbrook’s
formulation, because “the Constitution limits what counts as ‘law’”
through “the structure of our Constitution,” namely agreement by both
houses and the president, the Constitution commands that judges limit
themselves to the text that emerges from that process, refraining from
speculation about purposes or consequences and refusing to consider
sources other than the enacted text itself. 66
The second strain of the claim that textualism is constitutionally
required is grounded in nondelegation principles; it suggests that judicial
consultation of legislative history, particularly of sources like committee
reports, raises concerns from the perspective of the separation of powers,
and specifically the nondelegation doctrine.67 On this view, when courts
credit the articulated views of a subset of Congress, like a congressional
committee, they allow Congress to self-delegate in contravention of
constitutional nondelegation principles.68
In the next Part, we offer an extended refutation both of the
applicability of these arguments to the states, and of the suggestion that
federal courts have license to correct insufficiently textualist decisions by
entities like state courts. But it is worth pausing to note that, despite this
general sketch of the professed interpretive philosophies of a majority of
members of the contemporary Supreme Court, it is impossible to miss
that probing beneath textualism’s surface claims reveals significant
variety, as well as remarkable inconsistency, in actual practice.69
66.
Easterbrook, supra note 64. While Easterbrook refers to “law” generally,
he seems to be talking about federal law in particular, since the Constitution requires
federal law, but of course not state law, to be the product of a two-house-plus-presidentor-override process.
67.
John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 676 (1997).
68.
For a refutation of both of these arguments, see Victoria F. Nourse, The
Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 325 (2014).
69.
E.g., Franklin, supra note 50, at 123 (“[T]extualism is no more capable of
providing a neutral truthmaker or of cabining the influence of evolving social values than
any other leading method of statutory interpretation.”); id. at 125 (“Textualism and public
meaning originalism do not offer more objectivity or determinacy than their more
explicitly dynamic counterparts, however. What they offer is the illusion of those
characteristics.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Victoria F. Nourse, Textual

Gerrymandering: The Eclipse of Republican Government in an Era of Statutory
Populism, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1718, 1733 (2021); see also Anya Bernstein & Glen
Staszewski, Judicial Populism, 106 MINN. L. REV. 283, 284 (2021) (“[J]udicial populism

insists that there are clear, correct answers to complex, debatable problems. It disparages
the mediation and negotiation that characterize democratic institutions and rejects the
messiness inherent in a pluralistic democracy. Instead, it simplifies the issues legal
institutions address and claims special access to a true, single meaning of the law.”);
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1278 (2020)
(“[T]hose Justices commonly considered textualist or textualist leaning at times engage
in a form of backdoor purposivism, or at least speculation about legislative intent, that
looks surprisingly similar to the intent speculation inherent to traditional purposivism.”);

1248

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Consider self-styled leading textualist Neil Gorsuch’s “stunningly
atextual”70 opinion concurring in the Court’s decision to enjoin a
COVID-19 vaccine-or-testing mandate:71 over the course of seven pages,
the opinion made one passing reference to the statute that gives the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) the authority to
issue emergency temporary standards, and entirely failed to cite the
statutes that give the agency the general authority to regulate workplace
safety.72 Rather than ask about the meaning of the relevant statutes, it
framed the question as “whether an administrative agency in Washington,
one charged with overseeing workplace safety, may mandate the
vaccination or regular testing of 84 million people.”73 In answering that
question, the opinion relied on a vote in a single house of Congress—a
particularly unreliable form of legislative history, even for those inclined
to consider legislative history—a dubious characterization of an OSHA
brief in an earlier case,74 and most importantly, what it viewed as the
requirements of what is sometimes called the “major questions” doctrine,
a doctrine that substantially disempowers agencies from addressing
whatever a court might deem issues “of vast economic and political
significance,”75 even where Congress has enacted statutes whose text and
purpose seem to empower agencies to do just that.
The full Court formally embraced and announced the major
questions doctrine later that year in West Virginia v. EPA.76 That
doctrine operates as a strong clear statement rule under which courts do
not seek to ascertain the best meaning of the words in the statute; instead,
they ask only whether Congress specifically authorized certain agency
actions that the Court deems to be “major.”77 The doctrine is so
Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textualoriginalism [https://perma.cc/4BFQ-FKDE] (“Judges tend to deny the creative—the
legislative—dimension of judging, important as it is in our system, because they do not
want to give the impression that they are competing with legislators, or engaged in anything
but the politically unthreatening activity of objective, literal-minded interpretation, using
arcane tools of legal analysis.”); Anita Krishnakumar, Some Brief Thoughts on Gorsuch’s
Opinion in NFIB v. OSHA, ELECTION L. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2022, 8:06 AM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=126944 [https://perma.cc/59VG-WY89] [hereinafter
Krishnakumar, Brief Thoughts].
70.
Krishnakumar, Brief Thoughts, supra note 69.
71.
Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health
Admin. (NFIB v. OSHA), 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
72.
Id. at 668.
73.
Id. at 667.
74.
Id. at 667–68.
75.
Id. at 667 (cleaned up).
76.
142 S. Ct. 2587, 2610 (2022).
77.
See Daniel T. Deacon & Leah M. Litman, The New Major Questions
Doctrine, 109 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 22–32),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4165724.
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stunningly atextualist,78 it led Justice Kagan, in a vigorous dissent, to
announce that she “was wrong” when she (famously) “remarked that
‘we’re all textualists now.’”79
Or take the case of Bostock v. Clayton County,80 in which each
opinion—Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court, and the separate
dissents by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh—claimed the mantle of
textualism, and yet offered entirely different analyses and reached
entirely different conclusions.81 To the extent that one of textualism’s key
selling points has long been that it offers predictability and constrains
judicial discretion, the many strains of textualism on display in Bostock
should give one serious pause.82
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks once famously observed that, “[t]he
hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible,
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation.”83 That is, if anything, truer than ever in the context of
today’s “textualist” court.84

B. Textualism’s Inapplicability to State Courts
As detailed above, textualism is justified in large part by reference
to core structural features of the federal system: judges are unelected;
legislators are democratically accountable; the lawmaking process is
governed by some clear constitutional commands (bicameralism;
presentment) and some unarticulated yet significant constitutional
principles (separation of powers; nondelegation). These structural
features by no means apply in all their particulars to the states.85 And yet
the ISLT would project onto the states the current Supreme Court’s
preferred version of textualism even though the structural arguments for
textualism in the federal system do not mechanically apply—and in some
78.
See id. at 25; West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2641 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(describing the doctrine as a “get-out-of-text-free card”).
79.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2641 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
80.
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
81.
Id. at 1738; id. at 1761 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1823 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
82.
Cf. Franklin, supra note 50, at 125 (highlighting that, over time, textualism
“alters the parameters of what counts as a plausible interpretation of the text”).
83.
HART & SACKS, supra note 56, at 1169.
84.
In addition, empirical studies have cast doubt on textualism’s assumptions
about the drafters of legislation. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory

Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 905 (2013); Victoria F.
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case
Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575–76 (2002).
85.
See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, WHO DECIDES? STATES AS LABORATORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION 8–11 (2022).
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instances do not apply at all—to the states. The ISLT thus appears to
require the state courts to adopt textualism without adequate justification.
To start, in the vast majority of the states, judges of the highest court
stand for election—some partisan, some nonpartisan, and some
retention.86 In those states in which judges run for office statewide, they
are selected by many more voters than the average member of a state
legislature, or in many cases more than the voters who selected a majority
of the state legislature.87 The point is not that elected judges “represent”
voters in precisely the same way legislative representatives do,88 or are
imagined to do.89 It is that the judicial selection procedures in the states
do not reflect the same choices and values as the decision to insulate
federal judges from popular selection and direct political accountability,
which is one of the justifications for textualism in the federal system.
States deviate in countless other ways from the federal system when
it comes to the allocation of power and authority. To take just a few
examples, some state courts routinely render advisory opinions;90 some
state courts exercise enforcement discretion; and state courts serve a
range of administrative and even quasi-legislative functions that would
be unimaginable in the federal system.91 In contrast to the federal
executive, all state executives are to some degree plural:92 citizens in
most states vote for multiple statewide officials, sometimes dozens
beyond the governor and lieutenant governor.93 In contrast to the federal
system, many state legislators are subject to term limits.94 And as Miriam
Seifter and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have shown, state constitutions deviate
86.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 52 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 206–10 (
2020); see also JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF
CAMPAIGNING ON JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 1–4 (2012).
87.
See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2117–18 (2010).
88.
Id. at 2048–49.
89.
Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
1733, 1756 (2021).
90.
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (2001).
91.
Michael C. Pollack, Courts Beyond Judging, 46 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 730
(2021).
92.
William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448
(2006) (“The states . . . employ a divided executive that apportions executive power
among different executive officers not subject to gubernatorial control.”); see also
Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 282
(2014).
93.
See Marshall, supra note 92.
94.
See The Term-Limited States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZTS5-R5CE] (last visited Oct. 8, 2022); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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from the federal constitution in the degree to which they embrace,
sometimes explicitly, notions of “popular sovereignty, majority rule, and
political equality.”95
States also deviate from the federal system in ways more directly
relevant to questions about methods of interpretation. First, the
lawmaking process, which is central to the justifications for textualism in
the federal system, looks fundamentally different in many states from the
federal model. Unlike the president, most governors can use the “item
veto” to disapprove portions of appropriations bills and sometimes other
kinds of legislation.96 This means that the product that emerges from state
legislative processes is not the pristine result of a set of fixed rules of
procedure or allegedly unknowable compromises and legislative bargains
to which the chief executive has either agreed in toto or had a veto
overridden. Instead, the text of the enacted law itself may reflect only a
subset of the larger bill initially passed by the legislature. Similarly,
bicameralism, a core feature of the federal lawmaking process, is not
invariably a feature of state lawmaking, as Nebraska’s unicameral
legislature makes clear.97 In addition, principles of nondelegation have
long operated differently in the states than in the federal system, with
some states enforcing the nondelegation doctrine more vigorously than
the federal courts, sometimes with different sorts of justifications offered
than those invoked in the federal system.98
The point of all of this is not that every state’s structural features
are profoundly different from the federal system; indeed, many state
institutions and procedures closely mirror their federal counterparts. But
there is no requirement that they do so, and there is likewise no basis for
the assumption that the rules, principles, and doctrines that have
developed with specific reference to features of the federal system apply
to the states.
At a more fundamental level, many of the institutional-design
choices reflected in the federal system were animated by a desire to
restrain the legislature vis-a-vis other branches. In the words of Federalist
48, the legislature, “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex,” was most in need of
restraint; it was “against the enterprising ambition of this department that

95.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, Countering the New Election
Subversion: The Democracy Principle and the Role of State Courts, 2022 WIS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 5); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The
Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859, 861–62 (2021)
[hereinafter Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, Democracy Principle].
96.
Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171,
1175–76 (1993).
97.
Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, Democracy Principle, supra note 95, at 873 n.67.
98.
Seifter, supra note 89, at 1747–49.
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the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions.”99
In response to these concerns, the Constitution both imposed
substantive limits on congressional powers and adopted lawmaking
procedures that were, in the words of the Supreme Court, “finely
wrought and exhaustively considered.”100 On the substantive side, the
Constitution granted a set of powers to Congress rather than presuming
that Congress would have the police power. On the procedural side,
Congress’s ability to effectuate those powers was constrained by the
requirement of bicameralism, ensuring double review of legislation and
support from majorities (or today a Senate supermajority) of the members
of two very differently composed chambers. In addition, the requirement
of presidential approval (or large supermajorities in each chamber to
override presidential disapproval) was designed to serve as yet another
check or limitation on the process of lawmaking. These substantive and
procedural limitations have both federalism and separation of powers
dimensions: they restrain the federal legislature both from intruding upon
the states and from undermining liberty. And beyond these limitations,
the Constitution’s broader separation-of-powers principles have been
interpreted as largely restraining the extent to which any branch of the
federal government may intrude upon or exercise the powers of
another.101
But these concerns and dynamics do not apply wholesale to the
states. To begin, states do possess the general police power: “the state
legislatures are not limited, even in theory, to any listing of enumerated
powers.”102 Second, as the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged, separation-of-powers dynamics are entirely distinct in the
states.103 In contrast to the federal Constitution’s implicit separation-ofpowers principle, the majority of state constitutions contain explicit

99.
1961).
100.
101.
102.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333–34 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
See id.; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722, 726 (1986).
John Devlin, Toward A State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions,

66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1226 (1993).
103. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]his Court has held that the concept of separation of powers embodied in
the United States Constitution is not mandatory in state governments.”); Prentis v. Atl.
Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210, 255 (1908) (“We shall assume that when, as here, a
state constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is
nothing to hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.”). But see
Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1998) (“[I]t is something of an overstatement to say
that the principle of separation of powers has no application to the states.”).
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separation-of-powers clauses,104 and those clauses have been interpreted
in ways that deviate significantly from the federal system. And in many
states, an important check on the legislature comes not through other
formal institutions of government but from people directly, who act
through various mechanisms of direct democracy, like ballot initiatives
and referenda, mechanisms that are entirely absent in the federal
system.105
Despite these distinctions, assumptions about lawmaking from the
federal system permeate and are inextricable from the ISLT, which
entirely disregards these significant differences between the state and
federal systems. The ISLT’s insistence on textualism as the one true
method—despite the lack of articulated constitutional bases for the theory
in states—offers one window into the theory’s lawlessness.
The ISLT makes a constitutional issue out of state courts’ apparent
departures from the federal courts’ rigid form of textualism without much
if any justification. Consider, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
non-sequitur in Bush v. Gore, which maintained that, under the Election
Clause, “the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation
by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance.”106 But
why would that be? The Article II provision he invoked says only that
“‘[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct,’ electors for President and Vice President.”107
What if the state legislature has directed state courts to not interpret
a state’s election laws in accordance with textualism? As the next section
shows, some state legislatures have done just that. That reality illustrates
how Article II does not and cannot mean that “the text of the election law
itself . . . takes on independent significance.”108 A state legislature might
direct that state courts adopt a more flexible, purposive style of statutory
interpretation. Or a state legislature might willingly incorporate state
constitutional law as a background principle or constraint on state
legislation, including state election law. Either way, the state legislature
has directed that the text of election law is not independently significant.
The entire conceit of the ISLT is that a state legislature is the entity tasked
with creating a state’s election rules and governing structures. But in
reality, this version of the ISLT gives to the federal courts, not the state

104. Shaw, supra note 92, at 230–31.
105. Seifter & Bulman-Pozen, supra, at 95 (“To elevate the people above their
legislative representatives, state constitutions . . . provide opportunities for direct popular
lawmaking. . . . Today, direct democracy permeates state constitutions in the form of
provisions for constitutional or statutory initiative, legislative or popular referendum,
recall, and constitutional convention.”).
106. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
107. Id. at 112 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2).
108. Id. at 113.

1254

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

legislature or any other state office, the power to construe a state’s rules
regarding federal elections.
But the ISLT is an affront to federalism over and above the fact that
it imposes the federal courts’ preferred interpretive method on the states
while ignoring state institutional design choices. In mandating that
interpretive method, the ISLT denies to state courts the interpretive
latitude that the federal courts assert for themselves even as they maintain
some ostentatious fealty to textualism. Despite supplying several
different paeans to textualism, the current Court undeniably diverges
from textualism in some cases, often to further particular constitutional
or systemic values the Court identifies as sufficiently important to offset
the relative importance of textualism.109 The ISLT denies that same
authority to the state courts without an adequate basis.

C. Affirmative Separation of Powers Concerns With the ISLT
The separation of powers principles undergirding textualism do not
map neatly onto the states, and they accordingly do not justify a
requirement that states adhere to textualism as an interpretive
methodology (including when it comes to the law regarding federal
elections). The ISLT also carries with it constitutional problems that
sound in the separation of powers, since under the ISLT, the federal
courts would effectively require state courts to adhere to the federal
courts’ preferred methodology of interpreting statutes when the state
courts interpret state laws governing elections.
As this section explains, statutory interpretation “methodologies,”
how courts interpret statutes, are properly understood as a type of judgemade common law. Judges craft rules about how statutes should be
interpreted, including under the methodology of textualism. These rules
might include the idea that courts should presume that a legislature’s
failure to explicitly mention one remedy means that the law does not
provide for that remedy; the rules might also include the notion that
courts should not presume that a legislature gave an agency the authority
to decide a question of vast economic or political significance.110 These
rules do not derive from some codified legal text; they are, instead,

109. See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2608–10 (2022) (looking to
legislative intent when more than a textual basis for agency action is necessary); Brnovich
v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2338–40 (2021) (announcing a legal test
to determine violations of the Voting Rights Act that includes five factors nowhere in the
text); Litman & Deacon, supra note 77 (describing the major questions doctrine); Leah
M. Litman, “Hey Stephen,” 120 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1128 n.99 (2022) (book review)
(describing Brnovich).
110. Gluck & Schultz, supra note 84, at 932, 990.
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judge-made, common-law rules about the interpretation of legal texts.111
It is one thing for federal courts to adopt and apply this sort of federal
common law to federal cases involving federal statutes and federal law.
But it is entirely another for federal courts to require state courts to adopt
federal common law, rather than the states’ own body of judge-made
common-law rules about the interpretation of state legal texts. Doing so
represents an unwarranted and unjustified assertion of law-making
authority by the federal courts.
The separation of powers concerns with the ISLT arise from the
relationship between the methodologies of statutory interpretation and
federal common law. Federal common law refers to federal law that has
not been codified in a written enactment.112 The Supreme Court’s
canonical decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins113 established that there
is no general common law, and that federal courts should not freely make
federal common law.114 Subsequent cases have clarified that federal
courts should not exercise the power to make federal common law unless
a matter implicates an important federal interest, and there is the potential
for a substantial conflict between the federal interest and the application
of state law.115
Today, the reasons for skepticism about federal common law sound
largely in the separation of powers. Making law is generally thought to
be a legislative act better suited for Congress; federal courts accordingly
try to abstain from exercising the power to make law absent compelling
reasons to do so.116 A stronger version of this claim is that the
Constitution vests the legislative power, the power to make law, in
Congress, and not the federal courts; and therefore, when federal courts
engage in unauthorized, unwarranted exercises of federal common
lawmaking, they offend the constitutional allocation of authority by
111. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013).
112. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. METZLER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
635 (7th ed. 2015) (noting that modern scholars “have offered a range of definitions of
federal common law,” but using the term to mean “federal rules of decision whose
content cannot be traced directly by traditional methods of interpretation to [written
federal laws]”).
113. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
114. Id. at 78–79.
115. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988);
Clearfield Trust Co v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943). Under that
framework, federal courts may exercise federal common lawmaking powers where the
liability of federal officers is at stake, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or the rights and duties of the United States
are; these are instances where the application of fifty different legal standards and the
resulting disuniformity would be particularly worrisome. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at
366–67.
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; Gluck, supra note 111, at 809.
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exercising a power that is lodged in another branch of government.117
Justice Thomas summarized this view in a 2020 concurrence describing
the Court’s 1971 Bivens opinion as “a relic of the heady days in which
this Court assumed common-law powers,”118 to essentially “exercise[]
legislative power vested in Congress.”119
But when federal courts require state courts to adopt a particular
methodology for interpreting state statutes, federal courts are also
“exercising legislative power” by projecting federal common law, judgemade law, onto the states. Abbe Gluck has forcefully argued that there
are aspects of “statutory interpretation methodology,” including the
methodology that calls itself textualism, that are best understood as
“some kind of judge-made law.”120 As Gluck has recounted, many of the
canons of statutory interpretation, including those used by the modern
day textualists, “bring external, judge-created legal norms into the
decision-making process for statutory cases.”121 Gluck has accordingly
encouraged “a common law conceptualization of interpretive
methodology,”122 pointing specifically to the canons and the interpretive
framework described in Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law as examples
of federal common law regarding the interpretation of statutes.123
Gluck’s argument that statutory interpretation methodologies are a
species of federal common law supplies an additional layer to the
separation of powers analysis of the ISLT. The ISLT effectively requires
states to adopt a particular methodology—the one selected by the federal
courts—when interpreting state law. That produces an arrangement that
runs counter to Erie.124 Under Gluck’s conceptualization, many aspects
117. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1323–24 (2001).
118. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
119. Id. at 752.
120. Gluck, supra note 111, at 757–58; Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1907–
09 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic Interpretation]; see also Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Interpreting State Statutes in Federal Court, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 4–5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978040#.
121. Gluck, supra note 111, at 762; see also Anita Krishnakumar, Reconsidering
Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 826–27, 829–30 (2017).
122. Gluck, supra note 111, 757–58, 809 (“Erie’s animating concerns about
forum shopping, outcome determinacy, and vertical uniformity . . . arise when federal
courts decide what interpretive methodology applies to state statutes.”); Gluck,
Intersystemic Interpretation, supra note 120. Other scholars have disputed this. Connor
Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical
Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1727, 1810–11 (2010).
123. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 42.
124. See Gluck, supra note 111, at 755.
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of statutory interpretation methodologies, including textualism, reflect
judge-made common law. Accordingly, under Erie, when federal courts
interpret state laws, they should adopt state methods of statutory
interpretation.125 Doing otherwise, Gluck argues, would fail to apply the
(common) law of the states when federal courts decide a question of state
law.126 Yet the ISLT, rather than requiring federal courts to apply state
interpretive methodologies when interpreting state law, would require
states to use federal methods of statutory interpretation when interpreting
state law.127
Indeed, under the ISLT, the federal courts may be displacing more
than just state common law. They may be displacing state legislative
enactments as well. Some state legislatures have enacted statutes that
provide for state courts to use particular methods of statutory
interpretation when interpreting state laws.128 Some state courts have
likewise created guidelines for how state statutes should be interpreted.129
The ISLT displaces both state legislative enactments and state judicial
decisions about how state statutes should be interpreted—arrogating
massive and unjustified authority to the federal courts without sufficient
constitutional authorization. And these variations on state interpretive
authority underscore how the ISLT, despite its claims, does not elevate
state legislatures. It elevates the federal courts and their preferred
approach to statutory interpretation and election law.
III. FEDERALISM AND THE ISLT
In addition to the concerns that sound in the separation of powers,
the ISLT also presents potent federalism problems. The ISLT upends the
deeply rooted principle that states should be the final arbiters of the
meaning of state law.130 The thinness of the arguments for the ISLT—
from text, history, and elsewhere—are even more apparent when viewed
against that principle.131 Given the well-established, foundational rule that
states are the final arbiters of the meaning of state law, one would expect
Gluck, Intersystemic Interpretation, supra note 120, at 1926.
Gluck, supra note 111, at 791.
See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Article II as Interpretive Theory: Bush v.
Gore and the Retreat from Erie, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 89, 92–93 (2002); Amar & Amar,
supra note 6, at 55 (“[T]here is in this domain no general federal interest in implementing
any particular intra-state separation-of-powers regime or any specific textual interpretive
methodology.”).
128. See infra sources cited note 169.
129. See Gluck, supra note 111, at 779–80.
130. See Amar & Amar, supra note 6, at 18 (“[I]t does not mean business as
usual, in which federal courts almost invariably accept state law as pronounced by state
adjudicatory entities.”).
131. See sources cited supra note 6.
125.
126.
127.
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the constitutional text to be clear if it granted federal courts the authority
to serve as the final arbiters of the meaning of state law in some
circumstances. Yet, nothing about the text of the Elections Clause or
Presidential Electors Clause purports to elevate the federal courts above
state courts or other state interpreters.
There are other serious federalism problems with the ISLT,
including how it effectively requires states to allocate decision-making
authority among state institutions in a particular way, which flies in the
face of the idea that states have considerable latitude in structuring their
governmental systems. Moreover, rather than enhancing popular
sovereignty or democracy, the ISLT undermines both—by (selectively)
elevating the comparatively less democratic state institution at the
expense of other organs of the state and by requiring the state courts to
adopt an interpretive method that is opaque and conceals important
decision points. In the hands of the current Court and currently
gerrymandered state legislatures, the ISLT operates as like a one-way
ratchet that would allow the federal courts to seize authority to review
state decisions that expand citizens’ ability to elect the candidates of their
choice. No sensible conception of federalism supports that lopsided
scheme.

A. Federalism and Interpretive Authority Over State Law
Requiring state courts to adopt a particular methodology when
interpreting state laws is in considerable tension with the division of
interpretive authority between state and federal courts with respect to
state law. One foundational and enduring principle of federalism is that
state courts are supreme when it comes to the meaning of state law. This
principle was reflected in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first
congressional statute regarding the federal courts.132 In the provision
granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction over certain state court
judgments, Congress specified that the Supreme Court could review a
claim under the “Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission,” but that
“no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground for reversal,”

132. The 1789 Act has been called “probably the most important and satisfactory
act ever passed by Congress.” Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 52 (1923) (quoting Henry B. Brown, The
New Federal Judicial Code, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 339, 345 (1911)); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the
Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: A Word of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1739, 1742 (2015) (noting that “a good deal of federal courts scholarship and
jurisprudence focuses on the . . . first Judiciary Act of 1789 in particular[] as enormously
important, if not determinative of many questions at the heart of the federal courts
canon”).
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a restrictive clause that limited the Supreme Court’s ability to review
questions of state law.133
Subsequent cases make clear that this principle reflects constitutional
values. In Murdock v. City of Memphis,134 the Supreme Court addressed
the effect of the 1867 Reconstruction Congress’s amendments to the 1789
Judiciary Act,135 which deleted the restrictive clause.136 The Court
concluded that the amended statute still did not generally authorize the
Supreme Court to review state law questions decided by state courts.137
The Court intimated that “there were those [in Congress] who believ[ed]
that the Constitution gave no right to the Federal judiciary to go beyond
the line marked by the omitted clause”138—that is, that the Constitution
did not allow the Supreme Court to freely review questions of state law
in state court cases. The Court underscored that it would not attribute to
Congress the choice to authorize a federal court to review a state court’s
interpretation of state law because “[t]he State courts are the appropriate
tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions
arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise.”139 That
principle is still reflected in modern adequate and independent-stateground doctrine, which holds that the United States Supreme Court will
not review state court judgments that rest on independent state-law
grounds that are adequate to support the state court judgment.140 The
adequate and independent state ground doctrine recognizes that the state
courts are comparative experts in state law and state law may rightfully
diverge from federal law.141

133. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1257). Note that the Supreme Court may conduct a limited review of socalled antecedent questions of state law that tee up, and are a threshold to reaching, a
federal question. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816);
FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 488 (“[W]here a state law
ruling serves as an antecedent for determining whether a federal right has been violated,
some review of the basis for the state court’s determination of the state-law question is
essential if the federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination.”).
134. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
135. Id. at 591.
136. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 39 Stat. 385, 386–87 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
137. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) at 630–32.
138. Id. at 618–19.
139. Id. at 626.
140. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–42 (1983).
141. Id. at 1039–40 (explaining that “[t]he process of examining state law is
unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally
unfamiliar” and so “[r]espect for the independence of state courts . . . ha[s] been the
cornerstone[] of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and
independent state ground”).
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A wide range of doctrines and statutes reinforce the point that it is
for state courts, not federal courts, to decide how to interpret state law.142
Abstention doctrines allow the federal courts to decline to hear cases that
raise unsettled questions of state law. In Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Pullman Co.,143 the Supreme Court held that federal courts should
decline to adjudicate cases where the resolution of an ambiguous question
of state law could obviate the need to decide a federal constitutional
question.144 Such cases, the Court reasoned, were more properly heard
first by state courts: “[r]eading the [state] statutes and the [state] decisions
as outsiders without special competence in [state] law” was not preferred
because “the last word on the statutory authority . . . belongs neither to
us nor to the district court but to the [state] supreme court.”145 The scope
of permissible suits against state officers for injunctive relief also reflects
the principle that questions about the meaning of state law belong in the
state court system. While private citizens can obtain prospective
injunctive relief against state officers for violating federal law,146 they
cannot obtain similar injunctive relief against state officers for violating
state law.147 One reason for that dichotomy is, according to the Court,
because it is “difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty
than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their
conduct to state law.”148 While state courts are viewed as presumptively
competent to adjudicate questions of federal law, it is telling that there is
no such presumption when it comes to federal-court competence to
resolve state-law questions.149
Yet the ISLT would interpose the federal courts between state courts
and state law, arrogating to the federal courts the authority to interpret
state law, and to do so according to the federal courts’ preferred
methodology. That much is readily apparent from even the most general
statements of the ISLT in judicial opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
142. See, e.g., Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 293, 298 (1832)
(holding that federal courts must respect state courts’ interpretations of state statutes).
143. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
144. Id. at 499–501.
145. Id. at 499–500.
146. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908).
147. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105–06 (1984).
148. Id. at 106.
149. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control
the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and A New Synthesis, 124
U. PA. L. REV. 45, 56 (1975) (“The Madisonian Compromise was based, therefore, on
the assumption that lower federal courts need not exist because state courts could always
stand in their stead to provide adequate remedies and dispense justice as needed”).
Proponents of ISLT seem eager to abandon these long-standing principles. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089, 1091 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
North Carolina state courts incorrectly interpreted provisions in the North Carolina
constitution because the court’s “explanations have the hallmarks of legislation”).
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concurrence in Bush v. Gore loudly proclaimed that, under ISLT, “the
text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts
of the States, takes on independent significance.”150 And invoking that
concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh likewise insisted that the ISLT “requires
federal courts to ensure that state courts do not rewrite state election
laws.”151

B. Federalism and State Governance Structures
The idea that states enjoy interpretive primacy over questions of
state law reflects another, related principle of federalism that the ISLT
also upends—that the states enjoy considerable autonomy in how they
choose to structure their government systems, including their courts. As
Part I explained, how a state chooses to structure its court system has
implications for how state law is and should be interpreted. Here too,
many doctrines reflect the understanding that states enjoy substantial
latitude in allocating decision-making authority within and among state
institutions. Consider the Supreme Court decisions grappling with
whether a state court’s interpretation of a state criminal statute applies
retroactively to cases that have become final.152 Federal court
interpretations of federal criminal statutes necessarily apply retroactively
because, in the federal system, Congress, not the courts, makes criminal
law.153 But in a series of cases, the Court has made clear that, because
state judicial systems may be structured differently than the federal
judicial system, the same principles of statutory interpretation and
retroactivity do not straightforwardly apply to the state court system.154
The Court’s decisions pointed to the various structural features of state
courts that differentiated them from their federal counterparts—including
how “state courts act[] in their common law capacity much like

150. 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
151. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 34–35
n.1 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
152. E.g., Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 227–28 (2001) (per curiam).
153. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998).
154. See, e.g., Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351 (2013); Rogers v.
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); see also Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal
Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 492 & n.353 (2018). Fiore v. White did not end up
deciding the retroactivity question, because there, the U.S. Supreme Court certified the
question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which determined that the state court’s
interpretation of state law did not announce a new rule, but rather had determined what
the criminal law meant at the time Fiore’s conviction became final (such that everyone
conceded that the Due Process Clause required the state to establish those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt). Fiore, 531 U.S. 228–29 (resolving the case based on
certified answer). The Court arrived at a similar conclusion in Bunkley v. Florida, 538
U.S. 835, 840–42 (2003) (per curiam).
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legislatures in the exercise of their lawmaking function.”155 “Such
judicial acts,” the Court explained, “whether they be characterized as
‘making’ or ‘finding’ the law, are a necessary part of the judicial business
in States in which the criminal law retains some of its common law
elements.”156
Even doctrines that impose some limits on states’ ability to structure
their court systems recognize that states retain considerable latitude in
those structural decisions. Under the valid excuse line of cases, state
courts may not decline to hear federal claims unless the courts have a
valid excuse for doing so.157 But the cases recognize that “[s]tates retain
substantial leeway to establish the contours of their judicial systems,”158
which allows them to structure their courts in ways that may lead the
courts to decline to hear federal claims.159 Recent scholarship has
underscored the wide variation that exists among state and local court
systems, which further strains analogies to federal judicial
counterparts.160 Alexandra Natapoff’s study of municipal courts, for
example, highlighted how much criminal municipal courts have in
common with state executive or legislative departments—commonalities
that outweigh their similarities to federal courts—and demonstrated how
municipal courts depart from the structural principles governing federal
courts.161
The principle that states may structure state judicial systems in ways
that depart from the organization of the federal judicial system reflects

155. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460 (summarizing defendant’s argument before
adopting it as a premise in subsequent reasoning).
156. Id. at 461. Because state courts perform different functions than their
federal counterparts, the Court declined to impose strict ex post facto principles on state
courts interpreting state criminal law, opting for more flexible due process standards
requiring only fair notice. See id. at 459–62. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, The
Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965 (2019) (debunking the idea that
there are no common law crimes in the United States).
157. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–94 (1947); Haywood v.
Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738–41 (2009). A “valid excuse” does not include a state rule
that discriminates against federal law or substantively disagrees with the policy
underlying federal law. Id. at 740–41.
158. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736.
159. They may decline to hear claims by out-of-state residents, even when they
involve federal law. Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377,
386–88 (1929). And local courts with similarly limited jurisdiction may bounce federal
law claims as well. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120–21 (1945).
160. See, e.g., Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA.
L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2020).
161. Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964,
994–1010 (2021); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 685 (2014); Pollack, supra note 91, at 724 (“State
court judges engage in decisionmaking in a whole host of non-adversarial settings outside
of the traditional context of dispute resolution.”).
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several basic features of federalism: First, there are benefits that flow
from having a diversity of arrangements in how states structure their
governance systems—including state judicial systems—and how state
governments allocate interpretive authority over state law.162 While the
literature on federalism is often couched in terms of the benefits of having
different substantive policies, there are also benefits from having
different processes for producing policies and for interpreting state
law.163 Second is expertise. State laws are better understood by the people
familiar with them—people who may also be more familiar with how
decision-making authority and interpretive authority are distributed
within the state. Third is sovereignty. While sovereignty may be an overinclusive and often imperfect term to describe the states,164 here it means
only that the states have the authority to create laws and to create systems
for interpreting and implementing those laws. All of the doctrines and
statutes surveyed in this section reflect the importance of these
principles—and demonstrate that states have, and should have,
interpretive primacy over state laws, including the authority to decide
how they should be interpreted.165
This backdrop helps to underscore why the ISLT does not, as some
defenders insist, ensure the primacy of the legislature. Rather, it imposes
the federal courts, and their preferred method of statutory interpretation,
on the states, rather than elevating the state legislature vis-a-vis other
state entities or offices.166 For example, some state legislatures have
enacted statutes that require state courts to adhere to particular methods
of interpretation when interpreting state statutes that do not correspond
to the federal courts’ preferred method of statutory interpretation.167 The
162. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099,
1102–03 (2005) (“Second-order diversity involves variation among decisionmaking
bodies, not within them. It favors interorganizational heterogeneity not
intraorganizational heterogeneity.”).
163. See id.; see also SUTTON, supra note 85, at 1–8.
164. See generally DON HERZOG, SOVEREIGNTY, R.I.P. ix–x (2020) (rejecting a
classic theory of sovereignty).
165. One might say that these doctrines suggest states should get the final say
over the interpretation of any particular state law but are agnostic about whether states
get to choose how to interpret any state law—i.e., about the process states use for
interpreting state law. But, deciding what a state law means entails making a choice about
how the law should be interpreted: according to which method, which sources to consult,
and other considerations. So, it would be odd to cleave off choices about what interpretive
methodology states use to interpret state laws from an ultimate decision about the meaning
of any particular state law.
166. Cf. Amar & Amar, supra note 6, at 18 (“The theory gives near carte
blanche to federal judges, when the key point of Article II’s election language . . . was
to empower states.”).
167. See, e.g., 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(a) (2022) (requiring more purposive
interpretation in some circumstances); OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020(3) (2009) (limiting
consideration of legislative history); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2005); id.
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ISLT would prevent the legislature from making that choice by
manufacturing a constitutional issue any time the state courts did not
apply a particular strain of textualism when interpreting state election
laws; the textualist-enthusiast federal courts could claim that the state
courts “rewrote” state election law because the state courts had deigned
to apply the statutory interpretation methodology established by the state
legislature.
That is far from the only scenario in which the ISLT, rather than
elevating the state legislature, instead establishes the federal courts as
superintendents of the state election apparatus (at least for federal
elections). For example, a state legislature could have incorporated state
constitutional provisions into state legislative enactments.168 Or it could
have made any number of other decisions to share authority over election
rules, such as by authorizing independent redistricting commissions or
state courts to draw districts.169 Far from reinforcing popular sovereignty
and democracy, as proponents of the ISLT have suggested, the ISLT
jettisons those values on the basis of the federal courts’ preferred method
of statutory interpretation.
Even if the ISLT did empower the state legislature vis-a-vis other
arms of the state, that would carry its own federalism concerns.170
Federal courts do not have the general authority to restructure state
governments and allocate decision-making authority within the states as
they see fit.171 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested there are unique
constitutional federalism concerns with Congress or the courts tinkering
with a state’s governance structures, including how the state chooses to
allocate governing authority within state government.172 Scholars have
made a similar claim, arguing that congressional and judicial efforts to

§§ 312.005, 312.006(a); see also H.B. 5033, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
2003); Gluck, supra note 44, at 1786 (“Every state legislature in the nation has enacted
a number of canons of construction.”).
168. Shapiro, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6); Amar & Amar, supra note 6, at
32.
169. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S.
787, 826 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1988) (“The
guarantee clause, moreover, restricts the federal government’s power to interfere with
the organizational structure and governmental processes chosen by a state’s residents.”).
171. Shapiro, supra note 6 (manuscript at 8–9).
172. E.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937)
(“How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly,
if not always, a question for the state itself.”); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879)
(“Each State has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for municipal
purposes, and to regulate their local government.”).
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elevate some state decisionmakers over others pose particular federalism
concerns.173
Yet that is precisely what the independent state legislature theory
would do—mandate that states structure their governmental systems in
particular ways. The theory could forbid states from adopting a
governmental system (like the federal one) under which state laws are
subordinate to state constitutional provisions.174 One possible variant of
this strand of the ISLT, floated recently by Justice Alito in a dissent from
denial of certiorari, would be that state courts could not subordinate state
laws to general or vague state constitutional provisions.175
This particular iteration of the ISLT would place the federal courts
in the absurd position of determining when particular state constitutional
provisions are open and vague, such that state courts exceed their
authority when they rely on them to construe state statutes.176 This inquiry
could not be administered in a principled or coherent way, in part because
it would require the Justices to assess each individual state constitutional
provision—a matter they are concededly not experts in. State
constitutional provisions may also be permissibly interpreted by state
courts even when the provisions are framed more generally. Yet this
iteration of the theory imagines that the federal courts could create some
sort of federal constitutional line distinguishing narrow and specific state
constitutional provisions from more open-ended ones. The federal
constitution makes no such distinction, and federal courts should not
invent one. This variant of the ISLT would be yet another mechanism for
the federal courts to restrict state institutional design choices in the name
of the federal courts’ preferred interpretive approach;177 here, the ISLT
173. Merritt, supra note 170, at 10–11; Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures
and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 1603–04 (2015).
174. See, e.g., Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 738

(2021) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (raising constitutional concerns
about a state supreme court decision invalidating an election law provision on state
constitutional grounds); see also Amar & Amar, supra note 6, at 20 (“So too, as a
backdrop principle, state peoples and state constitutions are masters of state
legislatures.”).
175. Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089, 1090 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting from
denial of application for stay) (criticizing North Carolina Supreme Court for relying on
constitutional provisions that do not “say[] anything about partisan gerrymandering, and
all but one make no reference to elections at all”). As a side note, the sheer number of
proposed variants of the ISLT seems to confirm that the ISLT is an idea in search of a
legal basis, rather than a principle of law.
176. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 2901
(2022) (No. 21-1271) (arguing that state courts may not rely on “on vague and abstract
state constitutional language requiring ‘free’ or ‘fair’ elections to essentially create their
own election code”).
177. So too would a newly minted variant of the independent state legislature
theory its proponents have termed the ‘constitutional’ state legislature doctrine. See
William Baude & Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court Has a Perfectly Good
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would prevent states from adopting and state courts from enforcing
generally worded constitutional provisions in the context of federal
elections.
Or consider the question of state institutional-design choices around
election administration more specifically. As a matter of practice, state
legislatures devolve nearly all of their administrative authority for
election administration—on everything from where to site voting
locations, to what kind of opportunity to give voters to cure ballot
defects, to how far from vote-counting official election observers must
remain—to local authorities or to state administrative agencies.178
Under the independent state legislature theory, the legislature must
be the body to make election law—not the people through state
constitutional provisions, not state courts interpreting those provisions,
not agencies or local administrators exercising authority delegated by the
legislature or conferred by the state constitution. The theory could forbid
states from structuring a governmental system in a way that gave state
courts interpretive latitude over state law, and contemplated that
legislative enactments would be authoritatively construed by state
courts.179 Furthermore, the theory could forbid states from structuring
their governmental system in a way that allowed state or local officials
to exercise delegated authority to conduct elections.180 It could also
Option

in
Its
Most
Divisive
Case,
ATL.
(Oct.
11,
2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/10/supreme-court-independent-statelegislature-doctrine/671695/ [https://perma.cc/B3CP-FLW7]. Under that theory, state
legislatures might (or might not, based on subsequent posts) be able to delegate certain
functions such as drawing district lines to other state offices, including the state courts.
See Will Baude, The Constitutional State Legislature Doctrine, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 13, 2022, 10:32 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2022/10/13/theconstitutional-state-legislature-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/6CEZ-E9UU]. Here too, this
variant would constrain state institutional design choices with no basis in law,
compromising core principles of federalism. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120-24(a1)
(authorizing state courts to “impose an interim districting plan”); id. § 1-267.1
(authorizing state courts to review legislative redistricting efforts). Without the power to
draw maps, some state courts have effectively lost the power to review districting maps
in the face of intransigence from independent redistricting commissions, legislatures, and
federal courts. See Michael Douglas, Redistricting: Ohio Chief Justice O’Connor Finds
Flaws in Reasoning of Federal Judges, AKRON BEACON J. (June 5, 2022, 6:00 AM),
https://www.beaconjournal.com/story/opinion/columns/2022/06/05/ohio-redistrictingpanel-gets-pass-federal-court/7482727001/ [https://perma.cc/2KKL-JJUU].
178. Shapiro, supra note 6 (manuscript at 18).
179. See id. (manuscript at 38) (critiquing ISLT cases on the ground that they
“failed to address what the state legislatures actually did when they passed election laws,”
including whether the legislatures incorporated state constitutional provisions and
principles into laws).
180. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct.
28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (raising
constitutional concerns with Wisconsin Elections Commission’s decisions to send
absentee ballot applications because “[t]he Constitution provides that state legislatures .
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require state actors performing their roles under a state’s electionadministration scheme to interpret state statutes using the current U.S.
Supreme Court’s preferred textualist method and tools.
The independent state legislature theory would effectively
commandeer the states to structure and even operate their governments
in particular ways—with a legislature that is divorced from other
decision-making bodies and supreme to those other bodies. It is worth
considering how the Court might react to a federal statute that sought to
do the same thing. What would the Court do if Congress were to enact a
law directing states to make all policy decisions through the legislature,
rather than through state constitutions, state courts, or state executive
branches, notwithstanding state constitutional provisions to the
contrary?181 It is difficult to imagine that the Court would uphold the
statute. And for good reason: such a statute would fly in the face of the
notion that states enjoy broad autonomy and flexibility to structure their
governmental systems.182
There are also serious reasons to doubt that the Framers would have
empowered the state legislatures vis-a-vis all other state offices, as the
ISLT purports to do. Recall Madison’s famous fears about factions,
where “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a
minority of the whole, . . . are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens,
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”183
Factions may be more of a problem in state legislatures than in the federal
legislature, and also more of a problem in state legislatures than in state
. . not other state officials . . . bear primary responsibility for setting election rules”);
Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 47 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether the legislature “could delegate its Election Clause authority to” the Board). But
see Krass, supra note 6.
181. See generally, Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 1201 (1999) (cataloguing constitutional and policy arguments for and against
federal law being able to delegate federal powers to specific state or local institutions in
contravention of the state legislature).
182. By way of an example: the Supreme Court has held that Congress violated
the principle that states can structure their own governments, including the power to
select the location of a state’s capitol, when it predicated admission to the union on
conditions relating wholly to matters under state control. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559,
565 (1911) (“The power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when and
how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public
funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers.”); Leah M. Litman,
Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1216–29 (2016) (explaining why
Coyle should be read as a Tenth Amendment case). If the Tenth Amendment does not
permit the federal government to tell the states where to locate their state capitol, it
probably does not permit the federal government to tell the states how to structure their
governmental bodies and allocate decision-making authority among them.
183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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executive offices or judicial ones. Federalist No. 10 warned of the
“violence of faction,” a “dangerous vice” that produces “instability,
injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils.”184 The
Guarantee Clause also obligates the United States to guarantee every state
a republican form of government.185 Both suggest some hesitation or fear
on the part of the constitutional drafters of empowering state legislatures
so dramatically.
The ISLT represents a federalism about-face in more ways than one.
Consider the ISLT alongside the Court’s partisan gerrymandering
decision, Rucho v. Common Cause,186 which held that partisan
gerrymandering presented a nonjusticiable political question for the
federal courts.187 Discussing the history of “electoral district problems,”
Rucho declared, “[a]t no point was there a suggestion that the federal
courts had a role to play. Nor was there any indication that the Framers
had ever heard of courts doing such a thing.”188 Proponents of the ISLT
position the federal courts as the arbiters of how states may conduct
federal elections, even though, according to the Rucho Court, the
Framers had apparently never “heard of courts doing such a thing.”189
Indeed, Rucho specifically maintained that while federal courts could not
address partisan gerrymandering, state courts could do so, and by relying
on state constitutions no less: “[p]rovisions in state statutes and state
constitutions can provide standards and guidance for state courts to
apply.”190 In other words, Rucho assured the country that while it was a
problem for federal courts to address partisan gerrymandering, state
courts could continue to do so. The ISLT is fatally inconsistent with that
discussion in Rucho. For the Court to embrace the ISLT would represent
a blatant federalism bait and switch. With one hand, the Court would be
saying that it is a problem for federal courts to review state legislative
actions that impede citizens’ ability to elect the candidates of their choice,
but, with the other, that it is somehow a constitutional requirement for
federal courts to review state executive or state judicial actions that
enhance citizens’ ability to elect the candidates of their choice. That is
not a coherent—much less a defensible—vision of judicial federalism.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 47.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
139 S. Ct. 2482 (2019).
Id. at 2508.
Id. at 2496.

Id.
Id. at 2507 (emphases added).
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C. Federalism and Democracy
Finally, there may be particular concerns with imposing uniformity
on the states and requiring this particular method of interpretation with
respect to election law. Several scholars of interpretation have forcefully
argued that the Supreme Court’s wooden brand of textualism obscures
various choices that courts make in the course of interpreting legal texts.
Bill Eskridge and Victoria Nourse have labeled one such device “textual
gerrymandering,” which occurs when courts choose what text they are
interpreting (i.e., a discrete word or a larger phrase), as well as the
context in which to read the text (in light of the whole act, whole code,
and/or larger corpus of statutory law).191 Cary Franklin highlighted a
similar practice in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County,192 which interpreted Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.193 Franklin, too, exposes
the “shadow decision points” at which courts make “generally
unacknowledged, often outcome-determinative choices about how to
interpret statutory text,”194 allowing the Court to “mask” its exercise of
discretion, “render[ing] the exercise of that discretion [less] visible and
thus [less] professionally and democratically accountable.”195
Obscuring or masking the choices that courts make in interpreting
legal texts is problematic enough in the federal system. But it has
additional negative consequences in state court systems where many
judges are supposed to be democratically accountable for their
decisions.196 State court judges are subject to reappointment processes
and retention elections; their work is supposed to be evaluable and
evaluated by politicians and voters.197 Deploying a method of
interpretation that obscures how they are actually reaching decisions
significantly undercuts those structural systems of accountability.

191. Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 69, at 1736; see also Victoria Nourse,
Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons for Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of
Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (2017); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the
Constitutional Text from Originalism, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10–13 (2018) (identifying

the related phenomenon of “enriching” text).
192. See Franklin, supra note 50, at 126.
193. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
194. Franklin, supra note 50, at 126.
195. Id. at 128.
196. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of
Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1063, 1067–68 (2010) (noting
historical development of judicial elections as a mechanism to strengthen judicial review,
based on ideas about democracy).
197. Pozen, supra note 87, at 2070–71.
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CONCLUSION

The dangerousness and lawlessness of the independent state
legislature theory is difficult to overstate. This piece has focused on just
one aspect of this problem—how the ISLT, without adequate justification
or sufficient basis, projects onto the states a method of interpretation that
does not account for state institutional design choices, disregards state
governance structures, and flouts basic precepts of federalism and the
separation of powers.
But what, then, do the relevant provisions of Article I and Article II
do? If the constitutional provisions mentioning state legislatures do not
require state legislatures to control federal elections to the exclusion of
other state entities or actors, what do the provisions do instead? Without
purporting to offer a definitive account of the two provisions, we briefly
survey three possibilities, all of which underscore that the constitutional
text does not mandate the ISLT, and that the ISLT is not the only way to
give effect to the language of the Elections and Presidential Electors
Clauses.
One possibility would be to understand these clauses using an
origination theory, under which state law regarding federal elections
must originate in the state legislature, but may also involve other state
actors, including state administrators who implement it, or state courts
who interpret or even invalidate it.198 Under this theory, the Elections
and Presidential Electors Clauses would be satisfied so long as there is
some legal text enacted by the state legislature at the beginning of the
interpretive process. But so long as an administrator or governor was
exercising some authority they believed was provided for by statute, or
so long as a state executive official or judicial officer was purporting to
interpret a statute or measure a statute against a constitutional provision,
the Elections and Presidential Electors Clauses would have nothing more
to say about the matter.
A second possibility would be to graft the extremely rare, limited,
and deferential review of state law questions that is reflected in the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine onto the Elections and
Presidential Electors Clauses. Under adequate and independent state
ground doctrine, the Supreme Court (and federal habeas courts) do not
review questions of state law de novo. Rather, they look for extreme
instances of malfeasance or something gone obviously awry in the state
courts to the detriment of a federal right—a truly novel state
198. Cf. Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 799 F.3d 1035, 1049,
1060–64 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (concluding the Affordable Care
Act “originate[d] in the House, as required by” the Origination Clause because,
“[a]lthough the original House bill was amended and its language replaced in the Senate,
such Senate amendments are permissible”).
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interpretation without any fair or substantial support in the written text
of a law or rule, or in state court decisions; or evidence of intentional
manipulation of a state court rule to disadvantage a particular litigant or
to disfavor certain federal protected rights.199 In Bush v. Gore, Justice
Ginsburg described the prototypical examples of the kinds of state law
interpretations that would merit federal court review:
Rarely has this Court rejected outright an interpretation of
state law by a state high court. Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s
Lessee, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, and Bouie v.
City of Columbia, cited by The Chief Justice, are three such
rare instances. But those cases are embedded in historical
contexts hardly comparable to the situation here. Fairfax’s
Devisee, which held that the Virginia Court of Appeals had
misconstrued its own forfeiture laws to deprive a British subject
of lands secured to him by federal treaties, occurred amidst
vociferous States’ rights attacks on the Marshall Court. The
Virginia court refused to obey this Court’s Fairfax’s Devisee
mandate to enter judgment for the British subject’s successor in
interest. That refusal led to the Court’s pathmarking decision
in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee. Patterson, a case decided three
months after Cooper v. Aaron, in the face of Southern
resistance to the civil rights movement, held that the Alabama
Supreme Court had irregularly applied its own procedural rules
to deny review of a contempt order against the NAACP arising
from its refusal to disclose membership lists. We said that “our
jurisdiction is not defeated if the nonfederal ground relied on
by the state court is “without any fair or substantial support.”
Bouie, stemming from a lunch counter “sit-in” at the height of
the civil rights movement, held that the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s construction of its trespass laws—
criminalizing conduct not covered by the text of an otherwise
clear statute—was “unforeseeable” and thus violated due
process when applied retroactively to the petitioners.
The Chief Justice’s casual citation of these cases might
lead one to believe they are part of a larger collection of cases
in which we said that the Constitution impelled us to train a
skeptical eye on a state court’s portrayal of state law. But one
would be hard pressed, I think, to find additional cases that fit
the mold. As Justice Breyer convincingly explains, this case
involves nothing close to the kind of recalcitrance by a state
high court that warrants extraordinary action by this Court. The
199. See generally FALLON, MANNING, METZLER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112,
at 509–24, 529–46.
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Florida Supreme Court concluded that counting every legal
vote was the overriding concern of the Florida Legislature
when it enacted the State’s Election Code. The court surely
should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow
South.200
Under an AISG-like interpretation of the Elections and Presidential
Electors Clauses, the federal courts could not superintend state courts’
interpretation of state election laws outside of truly extreme
circumstances, such as where a state court looked at a magic 8-ball or
rolled a dice to decide what a statute meant. Put differently, federal courts
could review state court decisions for something like “indefensibility.”201
A third possibility is that the Elections and Presidential Electors
Clauses present nonjusticiable political questions, at least with respect to
state legislatures’ authority over the rules regarding federal elections.
This approach would recognize that, in part because interpretive
questions are difficult and often produce reasonable disagreement, there
is not a judicially manageable standard to determine when a state
legislature has sufficiently directed the manner of appointing electors and
the conduct of federal elections and when the legislature has not.
Our point here is not to defend or settle on one of these
interpretations. It is merely to point out that the ISLT is not the only way
of making sense of the relevant constitutional text, or even a particularly
sensible way of making sense of the constitutional text given the extent
to which it inverts core principles of judicial federalism and separation
of powers without clear textual authorization. Indeed, in what seems like
something of an irony, the ISLT, while purporting to project textualism
onto the state courts, is itself an example of failed textualism. Among
other things, proponents of the ISLT often ignore the mandatory versus
permissive nature of the Elections Clause relative to the Presidential
Electors Clause: Article I’s Elections Clause provides that “[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof,”202 whereas Article II’s Presidential Electors Clause, which
provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress.”203 So the Presidential Electors clause does not
200. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 139–41 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(cleaned up).
201. Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 360 (2013).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The clause goes on to
provide that “the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Id.
203. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphases added).
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require the legislature to direct the appointment of presidential electors,
even if the Elections Clause requires the legislature to prescribe the
times, places and manner of congressional elections. The ISLT also rests
on the worst form of decontextualization—isolating the word
“legislature” from two clauses, and then reading the word out of its
context and without reference to the rest of the constitutional text, which
in the case of the Elections Clause, specifically acknowledges that
another entity (Congress) may set rules regarding federal elections. There
is no constitutional basis for requiring state courts to engage in such
interpretive fallacies, in particular at the expense of federalism, the
separation of powers, and potentially democracy itself.

